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## Disentangling public preferences for health gains at end-of-life

### Further evidence of no support of an end-of-life premium

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## Cover page

*Title:*

Disentangling public preferences for health gains at end-of-life: Further evidence of no support of an end-of-life premium

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1 Disentangling public preferences for health gains at end-of-life:  
2 Further evidence of no support of an end-of-life premium

3

4 **Abstract:**

5 In many countries, it has been publicly debated whether health gains for patients at end-of-life (EoL) should be valued  
6 higher than health gains for other patients. This has led to a range of stated preference studies examining the justification  
7 for an EoL premium on the basis of public preferences - so far with mixed findings. In the present study, we seek to  
8 extend this literature. We apply a simple stated preference approach with illustrative binary choices to elicit both  
9 individual and social preferences for several types of health gains. More specifically, we investigate whether health gains  
10 at EoL, resulting from either an improvement in quality of life (QoL) or life expectancy (LE) are valued differently from  
11 similarly sized health gains from preventive treatment and treatment of a temporary disease. Furthermore, we examine  
12 whether social preferences are affected by the age of beneficiaries. A web-based survey was conducted in 2015 using a  
13 random sample of 1,047 members of the general public in Denmark. Overall, we do not find evidence to support an EoL  
14 premium compared to other health gains, neither when preferences are elicited from a social nor an individual  
15 perspective. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that the type of the health gain received matters to preferences for  
16 treatment at EoL with more weight given to gains in QoL than gains in LE. Finally, we find heterogeneity in preferences  
17 according to respondent characteristics, perspectives and age of beneficiaries.

18

19 Word count: 236

20

21 Keywords: End-of-life, Stated preferences, Public preferences, Social value, Elicitation perspective, Priority setting,  
22 Health economics

23

## 24 Introduction

25 Worldwide publicly funded health care sectors are challenged by rising expenditures, which has led to an increased  
26 focus on the optimal use and allocation of health care resources. Economic evaluation methods, including cost-utility  
27 analysis (CUA), are useful tools to inform decision makers about cost-effective use of health care resources. The CUA is  
28 recommended by health authorities in many countries, as it integrates the impact of mortality and morbidity into a single  
29 health measure known as quality adjusted life years (QALYs). Consequently, QALYs allow for trade-offs between quality  
30 and quantity of life, which facilitates comparison of cost-effectiveness across treatments. The principle of maximising  
31 QALYs is based on utilitarianism and relies on the distributive neutral judgement that 'a QALY is a QALY is a QALY'  
32 (Dolan, 2000). However, the public may consider some health gains more valuable than others, implying that QALYs  
33 may not reflect all the aspects of value that society generates from the health gain of a new treatment (Tsuchiya, 2012,  
34 McCabe et al., 2016). In many countries, access to expensive treatments at end-of-life (EoL) has received attention in  
35 the public policy debate, including the issue of whether treatments at EoL should be given priority over other treatments.  
36 In the UK, The National Institute of Health and Care Excellence (NICE) introduced an EoL premium in the evaluation of  
37 new treatments targeting EoL patients. The EoL premium is specified to add extra value to health gains if treatments fulfil  
38 the criterion of extending life expectancy by a minimum of three months for patients with a remaining life expectancy of  
39 24 months or less (NICE, 2009). The EoL premium is based on the rationale that the public values health gains from  
40 treatments at EoL more than similar non-terminal health gains (Chalkidou, 2012, NICE, 2009, Shah et al., 2018). Not  
41 surprisingly, this has led to a series of academic studies that seek to explore public preferences for health gains received  
42 at EoL with the majority of studies using stated preference (SP) techniques (Shah et al., 2018). So far the results are  
43 mixed. Whereas some SP studies find support for an EoL premium (Pinto-Prades et al., 2014, Rowen et al., 2016,  
44 Pennington et al., 2015, Shah et al., 2014), other SP studies find no or weak preferences for an additional EoL premium  
45 (Linley, Hughes, 2013, Olsen, 2013, Skedgel et al., 2015, Gyrd-Hansen, 2018, Shirowa et al., 2013, Shah et al., 2015).  
46 According to Gyrd-Hansen (2018), these mixed results may be due to substantial differences in both the SP designs and  
47 the use of different comparators (i.e. type of health gain, patients and illness). The overall aim of the present study is to  
48 contribute with new insight into preferences for an EoL premium. In an SP study, we set out to systematically elicit  
49 preferences for treatment at EoL premium by examining factors that can potentially affect preferences for an EoL  
50 premium.

51 In terms of elicitation methods, the majority of SP studies use variants of choice experiments (including person trade-off),  
52 where respondents are asked to choose between different health gains (Gyrd-Hansen 2018, Linley, Hughes 2013, Olsen  
53 2013, Shah et al., 2014, Pinto-Prades et al., 2014, Shah et al., 2015, Skedgel et al., 2015, Rowen et al., 2016). This  
54 allows for a comparison of the relative weighting of the alternatives and the defined attributes. Other studies (Pennington

55 et al., 2015, Pinto-Prades et al., 2014, Shirowa et al., 2013) have elicited willingness to pay (WTP) estimates for different  
56 types of health gains. Although WTP allows for an individual measure of the strength of preferences, the use of WTP in  
57 the EoL context is not without problems, as a comparison of WTP for different health gains rests on the critical  
58 assumption that marginal utility of income is unaffected by remaining LE. If opportunity costs decrease as LE approaches  
59 zero (Philipson et al., 2010), this will result in higher WTP estimates for health gains at EoL, all else being equal.

60 Most SP studies (Shah et al., 2015, Rowen et al., 2016, Shah et al., 2014) have focused on the extent to which the public  
61 prioritise patients with fewer remaining life years over patients with more life years to test the justification of NICE's EoL  
62 definition of a LE of 24 months or less. In a recent review, Shah et al. (2018) call for more research to establish better  
63 evidence of an EoL premium, including extension of the limited literature on the relative weighting of health gains from  
64 treatment at EoL and health gains from other types of treatments, such as prevention. Based on a single choice set,  
65 Gyrd-Hansen (2018) examines preferences for a gain in LE at EoL relative to a health gain in LE from prevention and  
66 finds a preference for preventive treatments over EoL treatments. Pinto-Prades et al. (2014) find preferences for  
67 treatment at EoL over treatment of temporary health problems. Like health gains from EoL treatment, health gains  
68 resulting from preventive treatment occur mainly towards EoL. However, the timing of preventive treatment is very  
69 different, as preventive treatment is introduced prior to the potential occurrence of the specific disease. In contrast, a  
70 health gain from treatment of a temporary disease allows for a direct comparison with similar sized health gains at EoL,  
71 with remaining (known) LE being the only difference.

72

73 So far, the preferences for health gains resulting from either quality of life (QoL) or life expectancy (LE) has only been  
74 studied to a limited extent in the EoL literature. In their review, Shah et al. (2018) argue that more research is needed on  
75 the decomposition of preferences for health gains at EoL to justify NICE's restriction of an EoL premium to gains in LE. In  
76 a recent study testing preferences for general treatment choices in priority setting, McHugh et al. (2018) find indications  
77 of preferences for QoL over LE at EoL, though without controlling for the size of health gain. Using SP experiments with  
78 defined QALY gains, Pinto-Prades et al. (2014) and Shah et al. (2014) also find evidence of higher valuation of gains in  
79 QoL compared to gains in LE at EoL, whereas Shah et al. (2015) find the opposite preference for a gain in LE over QoL.  
80 Unfortunately, Pinto-Prades et al. (2014) do not control for initial QoL, which may have affected the results, giving priority  
81 to patients with higher severity in terms of lower initial QoL (e.g. Baker et al., 2010, Shirowa et al., 2013). Moreover,  
82 Shah et al. (2014) include health gains in QoL, which fully restore the health (i.e. 100% QoL), implying that they are not  
83 able to isolate the effect of a generic gain in QoL from the potential effect of being cured.

84 Public preferences for health gains can be elicited from either an individual or a social perspective. Which one is the  
85 appropriate perspective, depends on normative considerations and the policy context in which preferences should be

86 applied. As different elicitation perspectives capture different values (Dolan et al., 2003, Tsuchiya, Watson, 2017), the  
87 variation in elicited preferences for health gains at EoL may be explained by the applied elicitation perspective. In the  
88 individual perspective, elicited preferences are based on the person's preferences for own health gains, whereas in a  
89 social perspective preferences comprise motives such as altruism and fairness considerations. Still, only a few studies  
90 (Pinto-Prades et al., 2014, Gyrd-Hansen 2018, Shah 2017) have investigated the impact of perspective on preferences in  
91 an EoL setting. Pinto-Prades et al. (2014) find preferences for an EoL premium when applying both a social and an  
92 individual perspective. As the authors apply different methodologies with different metrics (WTP in the individual  
93 perspective and person trade-off in the social perspective), they cannot separate the impact of perspective from the  
94 potential confounding effect of the methodology applied. In Gyrd-Hansen (2018), respondents are asked in a one-choice  
95 task to choose between treatments (preventive vs. EoL treatment extending LE) in either a private health care insurance  
96 programme (individual perspective) or a national health care programme (social perspective). Replicating one choice  
97 task, Shah (2017) examines whether preferences for giving a one-year prolongation of life to a patient with a remaining  
98 LE of either one or five years differ across an individual and a social decision maker perspective. In contrast to Pinto-  
99 Prades et al. (2014), Gyrd-Hansen (2018) and Shah (2017) do not find preferences for an EoL premium from any of the  
100 two perspectives. However, their results indicate a relatively stronger preference for LE health gains at EoL in the social  
101 than in the individual perspective.

102 Dating back to the fair innings argument (Williams, 1997), it has been debated whether patients' age should be given  
103 weight in general when setting priorities for treatments. In countries such as Norway and New Zealand the emphasis is  
104 on the size of health losses, which implicitly means prioritising young patients (Olsen, 2013). This view has been  
105 supported by previous SP findings that younger beneficiaries should generally be prioritised over older beneficiaries  
106 (Shah et al., 2018, Gu et al., 2015). So far only two studies have attempted to separate the effect of age from  
107 preferences for EoL treatment (Gyrd-Hansen 2018, Shah et al., 2014). Whereas Shah et al. (2014) find no effect of age  
108 of beneficiaries on preferences for treatment at EoL, Gyrd-Hansen (2018) finds a preference towards prioritising younger  
109 beneficiaries over older ones. To date, Shah et al. (2014) is the only study that has examined whether the age of  
110 beneficiaries affects public preferences regarding the type of the health gain at EoL. They find no effect of age but note  
111 that their results are uncertain due to a small sample size.

112 This study seeks to provide new insight on public preferences for EoL treatment. Applying a SP experiment, we aim to  
113 address four unresolved issues in the SP literature. First, we examine whether preferences for health gains in LE or QoL  
114 from treatment at EoL differ from similarly sized health gains resulting from treatment of temporary disease and  
115 preventive health care. Second, we disentangle preferences for different types of health gains at EoL, comparing  
116 treatments resulting in improvement in QoL as opposed to LE. Third, we investigate whether preferences elicited in the

117 individual perspective differ from preferences elicited in the social perspective. Fourth, we examine whether information  
118 on the age of beneficiaries influence the preferences for treatment at EoL. Finally, as a robustness check, we examine  
119 the extent to which our results are sensitive to the severity of health state in terms of the initial health status provided.

## 120 Method

### 121 The survey

122 The research questions were addressed using a web-based survey with a SP experiment. Respondents were asked to  
123 prioritise between two new treatments resulting in different types of health gains but of a similar size in terms of QALYs.  
124 The treatments were characterised according to a number of characteristics that varied within and/or across  
125 respondents. The sample was blocked in four versions according to the applied perspective and characteristics of the  
126 beneficiaries. Except for this, the choice sets were identical across versions. Table 1 shows the four survey versions.

127 The social perspective (used in versions 1, 3 and 4) was framed in accordance with recommendations in the literature  
128 (Dolan et al., 2003, Pinto-Prades et al., 2014) as follows:

#### Box. 1: Social perspective

*"Imagine two identical patients, patient A and patient B.*

*There is a possibility that the patient's course of illness can be improved with new and  
better treatments. Both treatments cost the same, but there is not enough money to give  
both patients the new and better treatment.*

*Imagine that you are the person who has to decide which patient should receive the new  
treatment.*

*Would you prefer to give an improvement to patient A or patient B?"*

129

130 In versions 3 and 4, information about the age of the patients was added in the form of the following text: *"Imagine two  
131 identical patients, patient A and patient B. They are both ["18-35"/"65+"] years old. There is a possibility..."*

132 The individual perspective (version 2) was constructed as an *ex ante* insurance perspective, implying that respondents  
133 were asked to make their decision without knowing whether or which of the health gains they would need in the future.

134 The framing of the individual perspective was constructed as follows:



Box. 2: Individual perspective

*“Imagine that you have a small risk of getting one of the following two diseases in the future. One disease is incurable and hence will end your life. The other disease is curable and will occur in the middle of your life. There is an equal probability of getting the diseases.*

*Imagine that there are new and better treatments, which can improve both disease paths. Both treatments cost the same, but there is not enough money to make both treatments available to you.*

*Which of the new treatments would you prefer to have access to, if needed in the future?”*

135

136 *The scenarios*

137 In the design, we included four different types of health gain scenarios: a) an improvement in QoL resulting from  
138 treatment of a temporary disease (QoL-T), b) an improvement in LE for treatment at EoL (LE-EoL), c) an improvement in  
139 QoL for treatment at EoL (QoL-EoL), and d) an increase in LE from a preventive treatment (Prevention). All four health  
140 gain scenarios are illustrated in Figure 1.

141 The QALY terminology was not used in the survey, and the respondents were shown graphic representations of all the  
142 gains. The QoL dimension was described in terms of a visual analogue scale ranging from 0-100% (from dead to perfect  
143 health). By focusing on changes in QoL instead of changes in specific health status, the design controlled for variations  
144 in the valuations of health/use of scale. In order for the respondents to become familiar with the QoL scale, they were  
145 asked to evaluate their own health and a fictive person's health (described by EQ5D-3L attributes) on the visual  
146 analogue scale.

147 The health gain scenarios were carefully designed so that results from choice sets could be interpreted as preferences  
148 for one type of health gain over the other, controlling for the size of health gains, severity in terms of initial QoL and  
149 whether or not current treatment was available. We applied equally sized health gains of 0.2 QALYs in all the scenarios.  
150 For scenario a, b and c, this corresponded to a gain of 40% QoL for a period of six months. The health gain resulting  
151 from the preventive treatment (d) was described as an uncertain gain in LE in perfect health (Pennington et al., 2015,  
152 Gyrð-Hansen, 2018). Specifically, it was stated that one out of 10 would get the disease but if treated would experience a  
153 health gain of two years in full health due to prevention of the disease. From an *ex ante* perspective, this corresponds to  
154 an expected health gain of 0.2 QALYs per treated person, which is similar to the magnitude in scenarios a, b and c. Initial

155 EoL health states (scenarios b and c) were described as health states with a LE of six months. In contrast, LE with  
156 current treatment for the health state of the temporary disease was left unspecified, as the temporary disease had no  
157 effect on LE. We specified the temporary disease to affect QoL for a period of six months. The initial level of QoL with  
158 current treatment was set to the same level of 40% in scenarios a, b and c, which ensured that elicited preferences  
159 would not be affected by severity effects from QoL (Nord et al., 1999). The initial level of 40% QoL in combination with  
160 the gain of 0.2 QALYs was chosen in relation to levels applied in Pinto-Prades et al. (2014) and on the basis of realism  
161 with actual QoL of patients suffering from terminal illness and reasonably obtainable QALY gains from treatment (Wisløff  
162 et al., 2014, Färkkilä et al., 2014). Moreover, this combination was chosen due to the design presenting the size of the  
163 health gains at EoL (b and c) and for the temporary disease (a) as visually identical (marked by the blue areas in Figure  
164 1 for a, b and c), making the design less cognitively complex to handle for respondents. Furthermore, health gains a, b  
165 and c were designed so that the health gain doubled the level of QoL or LE relative to the initial health profile. We  
166 operated with a maximum attainable QoL of 80%. This was done to control for the potential distinctive preferences for  
167 'perfect health' (QoL of 100%), which could otherwise potentially bias the results. Finally, all scenarios were described in  
168 terms of improvement in *existing* treatments to ensure that choices were not affected by the availability of treatment.

169 In order to test preferences for health gains at EoL over other health gains and preferences for health gains at EoL, we  
170 combined the four specified health scenarios in pairs of two, which gave five choice sets. An overview of the  
171 combinations is provided in Table 2, and an example of a choice set (scenario a vs. c, version 1) is presented in Figure  
172 2. We did not compare the two non-EoL health gains (scenario a vs. d) due to the focus on EoL premium. Prior to the  
173 choice sets, respondents were carefully introduced to the scenarios and were given the information that there was no  
174 right or wrong answer. Furthermore, we included an additional choice set, choice set 6, to test preferences for LE over  
175 QoL at EoL in another context. We presented the respondents with a choice between a treatment resulting in a life  
176 expectancy of six months and 50% QoL and another treatment, which resulted in a remaining LE of 12 months but at the  
177 cost of a low QoL due to side effects. In both cases the remaining life would correspond to 0.25 QALY. Hence, this  
178 choice set represents a simple trade-off situation, where respondents must choose whether or not they want to give up  
179 QoL for LE at the EoL. Figure 3 presents the visual components in choice set 6.

180 As a robustness test of the impact of severity on elicited preferences, we included three follow up choice sets for choice  
181 sets 1, 2 and 3 (1b, 2b and 3b), where the initial QoL level was altered to 25%. After answering each of the three choice  
182 sets with an initial QoL of 40%, respondents faced the same choice but with an initial QoL of 25%. Respondents were  
183 informed that it was the same choice, except that the initial level of QoL had changed. These QoL-gains also resulted in  
184 a doubling of the QoL level (now from 25% to 50%) for a period of six months, leading to an absolute gain of 0.125  
185 QALY. The gain in LE was described as an extension of life of six months at the initial QoL of 25% also leading to a gain

186 of 0.125 QALY. In total, each respondent faced nine choice sets (choice sets 1-6 and follow up choice sets for choice  
187 sets 1-3). A translated version of the SP experiment is available in the Appendix (for the social perspective).

#### 188 *Survey structure*

189 Table 2 provides an overview of the choice set scenarios, order and randomisation. The choice sets were divided into  
190 four sections: section A) QoL-T vs. EoL, section B) EoL, section C) Prevention vs. EoL, and section D) Side effects.

191 To limit the complexity of the choice task and thus the cognitive burden on the respondent, we decided only to randomise  
192 the order of the choice sets in section A and C (randomising choice set 1 and 2; and choice set 4 and 5) and not to  
193 randomise the position of the alternatives in each choice set (right vs. left). This ensured that the scenarios were  
194 introduced successively and that the EoL scenario was always placed to the right (when compared to a non-EoL  
195 scenario).

196 Prior to choice sets, respondents were asked questions about their own health. Subsequent to all choice sets,  
197 respondents were asked to state how certain they were about their answers. Finally, the questionnaire included standard  
198 socio-demographic questions on age, gender, education, people in the household, children in the household and whether  
199 they have family or friends that were currently terminally ill.

#### 200 *Piloting*

201 We conducted a pilot study based on a convenience sample of 30 respondents. The pilot was followed up by interviews  
202 with an emphasis on the understanding of the SP experiment. There was a specific focus on respondents' understanding  
203 of the health gain from the preventive treatment and the trade-off scenario in choice set 6. Respondents in the pilot  
204 expressed no concerns regarding any of the design issues. A few improvements in the individual perspective were  
205 implemented after the pilot study. Specifically, we changed the wording of the choices in the individual perspective to  
206 ensure that respondents understood that the choice sets were about choice of preferred health *gain* and not preferred  
207 health *state*. This change was retested successfully.

#### 208 **Analytical strategy**

209 Data for each choice set are analysed separately using the proportion test (z-test). Specifically, we test whether health  
210 gains at the EoL are preferred to health gains from other treatments (choice sets 1, 2, 4 and 5) and whether the type of  
211 health gain affects preferences for treatment at EoL (choice sets 3 and 6). Furthermore, for each choice set we test  
212 whether preferences differ in versions with different perspectives (version 1 vs. 2) and age of beneficiaries (version 3 vs.  
213 4) using a proportion test on two samples (z-test). The robustness test of impact of initial QoL level is performed by  
214 comparing choice sets 1-3 to their follow up choice sets (1b, 2b and 3b) using a proportion test (z-test). As further

215 robustness checks, we also analyse our data excluding 1) respondents answering *uncertain/very uncertain* to the  
 216 certainty question and 2) respondents with response times either below 5 minutes or above 30 minutes.

217 In addition, to test variation in the overall preference across choice sets we conduct a series of conditional logit  
 218 regressions. The four different health gains (QoL-T, LE-EoL, QoL-EoL and Prevention) can be described by three  
 219 generic health gain dimensions: *EoL* takes on the value 1 if the health gain is given in EoL and otherwise 0; *QoL* takes  
 220 on the value 1 if the health gain is an improvement in QoL and otherwise 0; *Prev* takes on the value 1 if the health gain is  
 221 prevention and otherwise 0. In version 1 (social) and 2 (individual), we test whether the overall preference differs across  
 222 respondent characteristics. This is done by including all respondent characteristics as dummy variables (subgroups) and  
 223 interacting them with the three generic health gain dimensions. We test preferences across gender (1=men), age  
 224 (1=+65), education (1=high education), self-reported health (1=good health) and whether respondents have a terminally  
 225 ill friend or family member (1=terminal relation). Correspondingly, the model then becomes;

$$226 \quad y = \beta_1 EoL + \beta_2 QoL + \beta_3 Prev + \beta_4 EoL * subgroup + \beta_5 QoL * subgroup + \beta_6 Prev * subgroup \quad (1)$$

227 Using the same model approach, we also test the impact of perspective (social versus individual) and beneficiaries' age  
 228 on the overall preference (young versus elderly beneficiaries). More specifically, we run the conditional logit regressions  
 229 with similar interaction terms defined by the three health gain domains and a binary perspective variable indicating 1 for  
 230 the individual perspective (version 2) and 0 for the social perspective (version 1). Similarly, we run the conditional logit  
 231 regression with interaction terms defined by the three health gain domains and a binary age variable indicating 1 for  
 232 elderly beneficiaries (version 4) and 0 for young beneficiaries perspective (version 3).

233 The sample comprised adult members of a web-panel of a Danish market research agency. A stratification strategy was  
 234 used to ensure that all four version samples were representative with respect to the age, gender and geographical  
 235 distribution of the Danish adult population (above the age of 18). Moreover, respondents were randomised to the four  
 236 survey versions. Respondents were compensated with reward points, which could be redeemed for gift vouchers.

## 237 Results

238 The survey was conducted in October 2015, and a total of 2,564 individuals were invited by email to participate in the  
 239 survey of which 1,047 completed the survey. The survey was closed shortly after reaching the target sample of 1,000  
 240 individuals (250 in each version), giving a response rate of 41%. Due to a successful stratification strategy, the sample is  
 241 representative of the Danish population in terms of gender, age and geography (see Table 3). In terms of education,  
 242 those with higher education are slightly overrepresented. The randomisation of the four version samples was successful,  
 243 implying that there are no statistically significant differences in either age, gender, income or education across the four  
 244 samples.

**245 Are health gains at EoL preferred over other health gains?**

246 Results from the choice sets in the social perspective (version 1) and the individual perspective (version 2) are presented  
247 in Table 4. Looking into the differences in choice sets comparing EoL treatment with treatment of temporary disease and  
248 prevention (choice sets 1, 2, 4 and 5), it becomes apparent that health gains obtained from treatment at EoL are  
249 generally not preferred to other health gains. The only exception is in choice set 5 in version 1 (social perspective), in  
250 which we find a preference for a QoL health gain at EoL over a preventative health gain. Results from the conditional  
251 logit regressions (Model 1 and 2, Table 8) confirm our finding, that the EoL dimension has a negative effect on the overall  
252 preference for health gains and thus is not preferred to other health gains. The results of our subgroup analysis show  
253 minor variation in the preferences for EoL. In the individual perspective (version 2), the size varies across gender, EoL  
254 relation and education. Although there is still a negative net impact of EoL, we see a significantly positive interaction  
255 effect for women, respondents with a relation to a terminally ill patient and highly educated persons (Model 4, 8 and 12,  
256 Table 8). Most notably, we see positive EoL coefficients for women and respondents with a relation to a terminally ill  
257 patient in the social perspective (Model 3 and 7, Table 8).

258 Focusing specifically on the health gain from treatment of the temporary disease, our results from the choice sets  
259 indicate a preference for treatment of temporary diseases over EoL treatment, which is most pronounced in the individual  
260 setting and for the lower level of QoL at 25% (see Tables 4 and 6). The only health gain from treatment of the temporary  
261 disease that is not preferred to EoL is QoL-T to QoL-EoL. The results are less clear for the choices between prevention  
262 and EoL treatments. When the choice set involves a preventative health gain versus a gain in LE at EoL, there is a  
263 tendency to prefer prevention (significant in the individual perspective), whereas the results are more mixed for the  
264 choice set between prevention and gain in QoL at EoL. In the social perspective (version 1), QoL-EoL is preferred to the  
265 preventative health gain, but in the individual perspective (version 2) we do not find preference for one over the other.

**266 What is most important at EoL: quality or quantity?**

267 For the choice sets directly comparing different health gains at EoL (choice sets 3 and 6), we find a clear preference for  
268 gain in QoL over gain in LE. This is observed across perspectives and for both initial QoL levels (Table 4). Comparing  
269 the preferences across initial QoL, we find the strongest preference for QoL at the lowest initial QoL level of 25% (Table  
270 6). The preference for QoL at EoL is especially pronounced for the trade-off in choice set 6, where the vast majority  
271 (more than 84% in all versions) prefer treatment A without side effects and thus are not willing to trade QoL for  
272 prolongation of life in treatment B. These results are supported, when we test for differences across choice sets 1 vs. 2  
273 and 4 vs. 5 (see Table 7). For both comparisons, one scenario is kept constant (QoL-T or Prevention), implying that the  
274 only change across the paired choice sets is whether the gain at EoL is in terms of QoL or LE. Here, we also see a clear  
275 pattern of improvements in QoL being more preferred relative to improvements in LE, when these two health gains are

276 compared to other non-EoL health gains. Furthermore, the conditional logit regressions confirm that the QoL dimension  
277 is found to be a positive main driver of the overall preferences for health gains (Model 1 and 2, Table 8). However, this is  
278 not isolated to EoL.

#### 279 **Does perspective influence preferences?**

280 Focusing on choice sets 1 and 2 (see Table 4), we find some significant differences in preferences between the social  
281 and the individual perspective (version 1 vs. version 2). QoL-T is more preferred in the individual perspective compared  
282 to EoL, which means that, relatively, more respondents prefer a health gain at EoL to a gain in QoL from treatment of a  
283 temporary disease in the social perspective. This is irrespective of whether the gain at EoL is in terms of QoL or LE. For  
284 the choice sets involving prevention against improvements at EoL (choice sets 4 and 5), we see a similar shift in  
285 preferences towards EoL treatment in the social perspective relative to the individual perspective, although this is not  
286 significant. For choice sets 3 and 6, we see no difference in preferences for EoL treatments across the two perspectives.  
287 QoL is preferred in both choice set 3 and 6 in both perspectives. Based on the conditional logit regression including  
288 interactions for perspective (Model 13, Table 9), we see that the EoL dimension affects the overall preference negatively  
289 in the individual perspective compared to the social perspective. Furthermore, from the conditional logit regressions, we  
290 find differences across perspectives when we look at subgroups (Table 8). In the social perspective, women have an  
291 overall positive preference for EoL, whereas the opposite is the case in the individual setting (Models 3 and 4, Table 8).  
292 The same pattern is observed for respondents with a relation to a terminally ill patient. They too have a positive social  
293 preference for EoL and a negative individual preference for EoL (Models 7 and 8, Table 8).

294

#### 295 **Does the age of beneficiaries matter?**

296 Table 5 presents the results from versions with young beneficiaries (version 3) and older beneficiaries (version 4).  
297 Comparing the preferences, we find few significant differences in the distribution of preferences for health across the two  
298 defined age groups. For the choice sets testing preferences for an EoL premium (choice sets 1, 2, 4 and 5), we observe  
299 a slightly stronger preference for improvements in QoL from treatment of the temporary disease as opposed to  
300 improvements in LE at EoL, when beneficiaries are elderly than when they are young (choice set 2). This effect is  
301 significant at a 0.1 level. The conditional logit regression including interactions (Model 14, Table 9) capturing differences  
302 in preferences across the two versions shows an overall stronger preference for prevention treatments targeting younger  
303 beneficiaries. Furthermore, the regression results show an overall tendency of a small but positive preference for health  
304 gains at EoL for younger patients (significant at a 0.1 level). For choice sets testing preferences for health gains at EoL,  
305 we observe a significantly stronger preference for a QoL gain at EoL relative to LE, when the beneficiaries are young  
306 (follow-up question for choice set 3 with initial QoL of 25%).

307

**308 Robustness checks**

309 Finally, we also carried out two robustness checks excluding 1) respondents answering *uncertain* (n=248)/*very uncertain*  
310 (n=36) to the certainty question, and 2) respondents with recorded response times either below 5 minutes (n=35) or  
311 above 30 minutes (n=66). For all four versions, and across perspectives, we find that the exclusion criteria do not alter  
312 the observed choice patterns and consequently do not have an impact on our main findings.

**313 Discussion**

314 Overall, we do not find evidence in support of an EoL premium. This is irrespective of whether preferences are elicited  
315 from a social or from an individual perspective and irrespective of type of health gain at EoL. The only exception is a  
316 preference for QoL gain at EoL over gain from preventive treatment in the social perspective. These findings are robust  
317 across different levels of initial QoL and apply regardless of whether the group of beneficiaries is defined as young or old  
318 patients. We see the largest difference in choice probabilities for choice set 2 with more than 70% of respondents  
319 choosing a gain in QoL for treatment of temporary disease over a gain in LE for treatment at EoL in the individual  
320 perspective. Our finding provides valuable input to the ongoing policy debate concerning public health care system's  
321 priority setting criteria and questions the justification of prioritising treatments at EoL over other treatments as  
322 recommended by NICE on grounds of public preferences. In relation to the other SP studies comparing EoL health gains  
323 to health gains from treatment of temporary diseases or a preventive treatment, our findings are in keeping with Gyrd-  
324 Hansen et al. (2018), who find no preference for a gain in LE at EoL over a health gain from prevention, but contradict  
325 Pinto-Prades et al. (2014), who find preference for EoL health gains over health gains from a temporary disease. Our  
326 study design is inspired by Pinto-Prades et al. (2014) but differs on several important dimensions. We use a between  
327 subject design, whereas they use a within-subject design applying different methodologies (WTP and person trade-off)  
328 and perspectives (social and individual). Moreover Pinto-Prades et al. (2014) describe the initial EoL health states as  
329 health states without treatment, whereas patients initially receive treatment in the comparable health scenario (temporary  
330 health problems). It is likely that this difference in access to treatment, if considered important by the respondents, could  
331 bias the results and thus serve as an explanation of the higher valuation of health gains at EoL found by Pinto-Prades et  
332 al. (2014).

333 Furthermore, our study also highlights that the type of health gains at EoL impacts the elicited preferences. We find  
334 evidence of a non-constant proportional trade-off in QoL and life years, as assumed in the QALY model, demonstrating  
335 that a QALY gain resulting from a change in QoL is valued significantly higher than an equally sized gain in LE at EoL.  
336 We find an even stronger preference for QoL gains for the lower level of initial QoL of 0.25, indicating that severity in



337 terms of health state also matters for the public valuation of health gains at EoL (Nord, 1995). Although the relative size  
338 is kept constant (100% increase in QoL), we cannot rule out that some of the effect of QoL severity could be driven by a  
339 change in the absolute size of a health gain, with larger health gains being obtainable in the scenarios with an initial level  
340 of 0.25 QoL. The preference for QoL gains at EoL is also confirmed by the preference for gain in QoL from EoL treatment  
341 over the life-extending gain from preventive treatment. Our results confirm previous results by Shah et al. (2014), Pinto-  
342 Prades et al. (2014) and McHugh et al. (2018), suggesting a tendency in the public to prioritise QoL gains over LE gains  
343 in the allocation of public health care resources to treatments at EoL. A finding that contradicts NICE's guidelines of  
344 prioritising life-extending treatments at EoL over other treatments including treatments that generate a QoL gain at EoL.  
345 Moreover, our results provide valuable input to medical decision making about individual preferences for treatment at  
346 EoL, including palliative care. In terms of shared decision making, it is vital that patients' preferences for life-prolonging  
347 treatments are taken into consideration, especially when treatment comes at the cost of a decrease in QoL (Henselmans  
348 et al., 2017). This dilemma is apparent in choice set 6, which demonstrates a strong aversion among respondents  
349 against trading off QoL for LE at EoL. When asked directly about the choice between a treatment that prolongs life but  
350 lowers QoL (due to side effects) compared to a standard treatment (without side effects), 85% of respondents chose the  
351 standard treatment. We recognise that the visualisation could have induced some status quo bias and thus impacted on  
352 our results. Yet, we would argue that the scenario is very realistic in terms of the treatment decisions that many EoL  
353 patients face. This includes patients in late-stage cancers, where chemotherapy is used as palliative care but with the  
354 risk of severe side effects. Placing our results in this context suggests that most individuals, if fully informed, would  
355 refuse this type of palliative chemotherapy when asked *ex ante*.

356 Besides being related to health status, a concern for severity can also relate to the patient's age at the time of treatment  
357 (Norheim et al., 2014). Due to our design setting we cannot rule out that a potential preference for EoL could be  
358 confounded by a preference for prioritising health gains to patients with more severe diseases, resulting in shorter LE.  
359 This distinction is important as age represents a separate distributional concern. A decomposition of preferences for EoL  
360 and shorter LE would require the two dimensions to be varied independently. In order to be able to compare preferences  
361 across perspectives, we deliberately decided not to control for LE. In the individual perspective, such a decomposition  
362 would imply that the same respondent is faced with different life expectancies (prior to illness), which we argue would be  
363 unconceivable and increase the complexity of the choices. However, based on our two versions with defined age of  
364 beneficiaries, we are able to examine the impact of age on beneficiaries, and thus remaining LE, on preferences for EoL.  
365 According to our results, we see a slightly positive preference for EoL treatment when the patients are younger  
366 compared to older (significant at the 0.1 level), which could be driven by the larger impact on LE of younger patients with  
367 a terminal illness (Model 14, Table 9). In priority settings, it has been debated whether younger age groups should be  
368 given priority over older age groups. Such an argument can be justified either on the grounds of the size of the expected



369 health gain due to their longer life expectancy (consistent with the QALY maximization rule), the potential productivity  
370 gain or the fair innings argument (Dolan et al., 2005, Tsuchiya, 1999). As the health gains in our study are identical for  
371 the younger and the older age group at EoL, and as it is realistic to assume that neither are active on the job market due  
372 to their severe health condition, this suggests that age impacts on public valuation of treatment at EoL in accordance with  
373 the fair innings argument. Despite this potential confounding effect of age, we find that, overall, non-EoL gains are  
374 preferred over EoL gains. Consequently, controlling for shorter remaining LE would only strengthen our findings of no  
375 preferences for an EoL premium.

376 We find a minor, yet interesting, impact on perspective of the elicited preferences. When comparing a gain in QoL in  
377 temporary diseases to EoL health gains, we find a relative stronger (less negative) preference for health gains at EoL  
378 when preferences are elicited from a social perspective compared to an individual perspective, suggesting that the  
379 perspective from which preferences are elicited - at least to some degree - matters. Our findings are in keeping with  
380 Shah (2017) and Gyrd-Hansen (2018), indicating that value judgments differ across perspectives, which implies that  
381 altruistic motivation and/or fairness considerations differ from narrow self-interest. From the regression analysis including  
382 respondents' characteristics it becomes apparent that the change in preference pattern across perspectives is primarily  
383 driven by women and respondents with a relation to a terminally ill person. Specifically, we see that these two groups  
384 have a significantly positive preference for EoL in the social perspective, whereas the opposite applies in the individual  
385 setting. This indicates an expressive alteration in value judgment among women and further suggests that social  
386 distance to beneficiaries significantly affects preferences. Unfortunately, we are not able to say what drives these  
387 motivational changes. Results from experimental economics suggest that women are more altruistically motivated than  
388 men (Brañas-Garza et al., 2018) and that altruism varies inversely with social distance between giver and receiver  
389 (Rachlin, Jones, 2008, Bohnet, Frey, 1999). If respondents believe that other people value EoL treatment more than they  
390 themselves do, then altruistic motivation would cause a change in preferences towards a relatively stronger preference  
391 for EoL in the social compared to the individual perspective. Hence, an explanation for the preference shift across  
392 perspectives observed for women may be due to women being more altruistic towards EoL patients than men.  
393 Furthermore, altruism would also be a natural driver for the presence of a positive preference for EoL for respondents  
394 with a relation to a terminally ill person. However, more research is needed to study value judgments and the impact of  
395 perspective on preferences for different type of health gains as recently proposed by (Tsuchiya, Watson, 2017).

396 There are limitations to the study that need to be acknowledged. We apply forced choices and therefore do not include  
397 an indifference option. Shah (2017) finds that inclusion of an indifference point has an impact on preferences. However,  
398 he finds that inclusion of an indifference point does not favour an EoL preference. Accordingly, we would argue that an  
399 indifference option most likely would not have changed our overall findings. Also, not including an indifference option is in

400 line with standard practice in the choice experiment literature (Bateman et al., 2002). As we did not mirror the choice sets  
401 across respondents (i.e. change the position of the alternatives within a choice set), we cannot rule out that our results  
402 could be subject to some right-left bias and that not providing the respondents with an indifference option could have  
403 amplified this. As a robustness check we limited our analysis to include only those individuals who took more than 5  
404 minutes to answer the survey as these individuals are more likely to have engaged in the task (and thus less likely to  
405 have been subject to left-right bias). Reassuringly, this does not change our conclusions. Another way to test the  
406 potential right-left bias would have been to have included another version of the survey that mirrored the left and right  
407 position of the alternatives in all choice sets. Furthermore, it should be noted that the choice sets were grouped into  
408 sections, and thus we did not randomise the order of the choice sets completely. Moreover, the application of an  
409 incomplete randomisation strategy of choice set and alternatives within the choice set is in line with the study designs  
410 applied by Shah et al. (2014) and Pinto-Prades et al. (2014). Another additional limitation is that we decided to include  
411 only one gain in length of life (6 months). As we did not test for the impact of different LE gains or durations of illness, we  
412 cannot rule out that our findings are confined to this setting.

413 Moreover, our study results are limited to ordinal rankings and should thus only be interpreted as such. Consequently,  
414 we are not able to estimate the individual strength of preferences (measured in terms of willingness-to-pay, for instance)  
415 of a preferred health gain. Still, and in line with previous studies with similar designs (Shah et al., 2014, Gyrd-Hansen,  
416 2018, Linley, Hughes, 2013), we use the propensities as an estimate for the overall preference intensity. Nevertheless, it  
417 could be argued that the appropriate analysis criterion should be whether the propensity is below or above 0.5 in  
418 accordance with majority rule voting and thus in line with traditional public referendums. Whereas this criterion limits the  
419 number of analyses that can be conducted (testing for differences in size across perspectives and choice sets), it does not  
420 change the major findings of our study.

421 We operate with two initial levels of QoL of 25% and 40%, and it could be argued that both these levels, despite being  
422 realistic QoL levels for terminally ill patients and comparable to levels applied by, for instance, Pinto-Prades et al. (2014),  
423 were considered very poor by the respondents. If this is true, it would imply that gains in length of life are considered to  
424 be of low value to respondents, which could have intensified the non-favouring of gains in LE at EoL. Unfortunately, we  
425 are unable to extrapolate our results beyond the benchmark of 40%, so that this question remains unresolved. More  
426 research is needed that examines the impact of QoL severity on the trade-off between quality and length of life at EoL.

427 **Conclusion**

428 Growing health care expenditures is a challenge to public health care systems worldwide. Consequently, this has led to a  
429 vibrant discussion of the rationale behind prioritisation including whether some types of health gains can be considered  
430 more valuable to the individual than others, and whether society prefers some distributions of health to others. This study  
431 sets out to examine the public's preferences for health gains at EoL compared to other health gains, elicited using  
432 different perspectives and for different age groups. Overall, we do not find support for a higher priority to health gains  
433 received from treatment at EoL and thus an EoL premium. This is irrespective of the type of the health gain although  
434 there is a stronger preference for gains in QoL than for gains in LE at EoL. Moreover, we find some heterogeneity in  
435 preferences for health gains across age of beneficiaries and perspectives. Preferences for an EoL premium is found to  
436 be affected by age of beneficiaries demonstrating that treatment at EoL matters more when beneficiaries are younger. In  
437 a social decision maker perspective, women and respondents with a relation to an EoL patient have a positive  
438 preference for treatment at EoL but preferences are reversed in an individual perspective. Further research should  
439 investigate the values beyond self-interest that comprise public preferences for treatment at EoL, including the impact of  
440 altruistic motivation.

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## 1 Tables

2 Table 1 – The different survey version.

	Version 1: Social	Version 2: Individual	Version 3: Young	Version 4: Elderly
Perspective	Social	Individual	Social	Social
Characteristics of beneficiaries	Generic (not defined)	Generic (not defined)	Aged 18-35	Aged 65+

3

4

5 Table 2 – Overview of choice sets in the applied design and ordering of the choice sets in the survey.

Section	Choice set	Comparison	Figure
A QoL-T vs. EoL	1	QoL-T <sup>1</sup> vs. QoL-EoL <sup>2</sup>	a + c
	1b	Same as choice set 1 with initial QoL 25% <sup>4</sup>	
	2	QoL-T <sup>1</sup> vs. LE-EoL <sup>3</sup>	a + b
	2b	Same as choice set 2 with initial QoL 25% <sup>4</sup>	
B EoL	3	QoL-EoL <sup>2</sup> vs. LE-EoL <sup>3</sup>	c + b
	3b	Same as choice set 3 with initial QoL 25% <sup>4</sup>	
C Prevention vs. EoL	4	Prevention vs. LE-EoL <sup>3</sup>	d + b
	5	Prevention vs. QoL-EoL <sup>2</sup>	d + c
D Side effects	6	No side effects vs. LE and side effects	Figure 3

6 Notes: <sup>1</sup>QoL gain from treatment of temporary disease (non-terminal); <sup>2</sup>QoL gain in EoL; <sup>3</sup>LE gain in EoL; <sup>4</sup>Follow-up questions testing

7 initial QoL level. Same choice but with lower initial QoL (and QALY size).

8 *Table 3 – Descriptives for versions 1-4, the full sample and the Danish population.*

	Population	Full Sample n=1,047	Social (version 1) n = 262	Individual (version 2) n = 261	Young (version 3) n = 262	Old (version 4) n = 262
<b>Gender</b>						
<i>Male</i>	0.49	0.49	0.48	0.49	0.48	0.48
<i>Female</i>	0.51	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.52
<b>Age</b>						
<i>18-39</i>	0.34	0.35	0.34	0.36	0.35	0.35
<i>40-59</i>	0.35	0.36	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.36
<i>60+</i>	0.31	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.29
<i>Mean</i>		48.4	49.0	48.0	47.3	49.1
<i>Median</i>		50	51.5	50	48.5	50
<b>Education</b>						
<i>Low education</i>	0.38	0.15	0.16	0.14	0.17	0.15
<i>Medium education</i>	0.53	0.68	0.69	0.68	0.67	0.69
<i>High education</i>	0.08	0.17	0.15	0.18	0.16	0.16

9

10

11 Table 4 – Results from social and individual perspective (versions 1 and 2). Reported in proportions.

Choice set		Follow up questions:					
		Initial QoL 40%			Initial QoL 25%		
		Version 1: Social	Version 2: Individual	Difference (version 1 vs. 2)	Version 1: Social	Version 2: Individual	Difference (version 1 vs. 2)
1	QoL-T	0.48	0.63	-0.15***	0.55	0.66	-0.11**
	QoL-EoL	0.52	0.37		0.45	0.34	
	<i>Difference</i>	-0.04	0.26 ***		0.09	0.31 ***	
2	QoL-T	0.61	0.71	-0.11**	0.72	0.81	-0.09**
	LE-EoL	0.39	0.29		0.28	0.19	
	<i>Difference</i>	0.21 ***	0.43 ***		0.44 ***	0.62 ***	
4	Prevention	0.53	0.58	-0.05			
	LE-EoL	0.47	0.42				
	<i>Difference</i>	0.06	0.16 **				
5	Prevention	0.43	0.50	-0.07			
	QoL-EoL	0.57	0.50				
	<i>Difference</i>	-0.14 **	0.00				
3	QoL-EoL	0.60	0.63	-0.03	0.74	0.72	0.01
	LE-EoL	0.40	0.37		0.26	0.28	
	<i>Difference</i>	0.21 ***	0.26 ***		0.47 ***	0.45 ***	
6	No side effects	0.89	0.85	0.05			
	LE and side effects	0.11	0.15				
	<i>Difference</i>	0.79 ***	0.69 ***				
		<i>n</i> =262/246 <sup>a</sup>	<i>n</i> =261		<i>n</i> =262	<i>n</i> =261	

Notes \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$

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*Reported differences are based on non-rounded proportions.*

*Differences between two proportions within the same survey (vertical difference) are tested using proportion test on one sample (z-test). Differences between two proportions across perspective (horizontal) are tested using proportion test on two samples (z-test).*

*a – Due to a technical error few respondents in version 1 (social perspective) did not receive the two choice sets with preventive health gain. Here  $n = 246$ .*

13 Table 5 - Choice of treatment across young and elderly beneficiaries (versions 3 and 4) reported in proportions.

Choice set	Initial QoL 40%			Follow up questions: Initial QoL 25%			
	Version 3:	Version 4:	Difference	Version 3:	Version 4:	Difference	
	Young	Elderly	(version 3 vs. 4)	Young	Elderly	(version 3 vs. 4)	
1	QoL-T	0.45	0.47	-0.02	0.48	0.51	-0.03
	QoL-EoL	0.55	0.53		0.52	0.49	
	<i>Difference</i>	-0.09	-0.06		-0.03	0.02	
2	QoL-T	0.49	0.57	-0.08 *	0.66	0.67	-0.02
	LE-EoL	0.51	0.43		0.34	0.33	
	<i>Difference</i>	0.02	0.15 **		0.31 ***	0.34 ***	
4	Prevention	0.50	0.48	0.02			
	LE-EoL	0.50	0.52				
	<i>Difference</i>	-0.01	-0.05				
5	Preventionn	0.41	0.37	0.05			
	QoL-EoL	0.59	0.63				
	<i>Difference</i>	-0.18 ***	-0.27 ***				
3	QoL-EoL	0.57	0.56	0.02	0.72	0.63	0.09 **
	LE-EoL	0.43	0.44		0.28	0.37	
	<i>Difference</i>	0.14 **	0.11 *		0.44 ***	0.26 ***	
6	No side effect	0.84	0.84	0.00			
	LE and side effects	0.16	0.16				
	<i>Difference</i>	0.67 ***	0.67 ***				
		<i>n</i> =262	<i>n</i> =262		<i>n</i> =262	<i>n</i> =262	

Notes \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$

Reported differences are based on non-rounded proportions.

*Differences between two proportions within the same survey (vertical difference) are tested using proportion test on one sample (z-test). Differences between two proportions across versions (horizontal) are tested using proportion test on two samples (z-test).*

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15 Table 6 – Test of impact of initial QoL (40% vs. 25%)

Choice set	40% initial QoL vs. 25% initial QoL						16
	Initial QoL	Version 1: Social		Version 2:	Version 3: Young	Version 4: Elderly	
				Individual			
1 QoL-T vs. QoL-EoL	40%	QoL-T	0.48	0.63	0.45	0.47	
	25%	QoL-T	0.55	0.66	0.48	0.51	
		Difference	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.04	
2 QoL-T vs. LE-EoL	40%	QoL-T	0.61	0.71	0.49	0.57	
	25%	QoL-T	0.72	0.81	0.66	0.67	
		Difference	0.11 *	0.10 *	0.17 ***	0.10	
3 QoL-EoL vs. LE-EoL	40%	QoL-EoL	0.60	0.63	0.57	0.56	
	25%	QoL-EoL	0.74	0.72	0.72	0.63	
		Difference	0.13 **	0.10	0.15 **	0.08	

Notes: \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*  $p < 0.1$

Numbers indicate the numeric difference between proportions for choice set 1, 2, 3 and their follow up questions (initial QoL 25%). Reported differences are based on non-rounded proportions.

A positive number indicate a stronger preference for QoL-T in choice set 1 and 2 and indicate a stronger preference for QoL-EoL in choice set 3 as the initial QoL changes from 40% to 25%.

Differences between choice sets with 40% and 25% QoL are tested using proportion test within one sample.

		EoL vs. QoL-T (choice set 1 vs. 2)		EoL vs. Prevention (choice set 4 vs. 5)		17
Initial QoL		Version 1: Social	Version 2: Individual	Version 1: Social	Version 2: Individual	18
40%	QoL-EoL	0.52	0.37	0.57	0.50	19
	LE-EoL	0.39	0.29	0.47	0.42	20
	Difference	0.13 **	0.08	0.10	0.08	21
25%	QoL-EoL	0.45	0.34	N/A	N/A	
	LE-EoL	0.28	0.19	N/A	N/A	
	Difference	0.18 ***	0.16 ***	N/A	N/A	

Notes: Reported differences are based on non-rounded proportions. The differences represents the difference in the preference strength for a health gain in QoL at EoL compared to a prolongation of life at EoL, when the two health gains are compared separately to either QoL-T or Prevention.

A positive difference indicates a stronger relative preference for QoL-EoL than for LE-EoL compared to QoL-T or Prevention.

Differences between proportions in choice sets are tested using proportion test within one sample.

Table 7 – Test for differences in preference for health gains at EoL vs. either QoL-T or prevention (choice sets: 1 vs. 2 and 4 vs. 5)



22 Table 8 – Results from conditional logit regressions on health and respondent characteristics.

	Base model		Gender (male=1)		Health (good health=1)		Relation to terminal patient (=1)		Age (old respondent=1)		Education (high education=1)	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
	Social	Individual	Social	Individual	Social	Individual	Social	Individual	Social	Individual	Social	Individual
EoL	-.049	-.563***	.308***	-.444***	-.018	-.501***	-.0145*	-.693***	-.011	-.522***	-.145	-.764***
QoL	.639***	.628***	.892***	.762***	.348***	.550***	.603***	.617***	.661***	.629***	.591***	.446***
Prev	.187	-.084	.436**	-.205	.177	-.147	.230	-.003	.204	-.063	.066	-.252
EoL*male			-.745***	-.241*								
QoL*male			-.517***	-.264								
Prev*male			-.506*	.250								
EoL*good health					-.051	-.089						
QoL*good health					.484***	.113						
Prev*good health					.017	.090						
EoL*terminal							.297**	.336**				
QoL*terminal							.116	.037				
Prev*terminal							-.143	-.216				
EoL*65+									-.183	-.231		
QoL*65+									-.111	-.001		
Prev*65+									-.082	-.119		
EoL*high educ											.232	.388***

QoL*high educ	.115	.358***
Prev*high educ	.292	.324

23 P-values: \*<0.1 ;\*\*<0.05; \*\*\*<0.01. Regressions are run using clogit with robust standard errors in Stata.

24

25 *Table 9 – Effect from perspective and beneficiaries' age from conditional logit regressions.*

	Perspective	Age
	Model 13	Model 14
	Versions 1 and 2	Versions 3 and 4
EoL	-.049	-.013
QoL	.639***	.431***
Prev	.187	-.117
EoL*individual	-.515***	
QoL*individual	-.010	
Prev*individual	-.271	
EoL*young		.181*
QoL*young		.075
Prev*young		.351**



26 P-values: \*<0.1 ;\*\*<0.05; \*\*\*<0.01.


27 Regressions are run using clogit with robust standard errors in Stata.

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
## 22 Figures

Figure 1 – Visual presentation of the four health scenarios: a) gain in QoL from treatment of temporary disease (QoL-T) b) gain in LE at EoL (LE-EoL), c) gain in QoL at EoL (QoL-EoL) and d) gain from preventive treatment (Prevention).





51 d) Prevention




52

Figure 2 – Example of a choice set (scenario a vs. c in version 1)

57


58 Would you prefer to give an improvement to patient A or patient B?

59 (Before answering, please look carefully at the figures)



60

61 *Figure 3 – Visual representation of the two scenarios in choice set 6 representing a trade-off situation, where*  
62 *respondents must choose whether or not they want to give up QoL due to side effects for a gain in LE.*



63

**Highlights:**

- No evidence to support an end-of-life premium
- Type of health gain impacts on preferences for treatment received at end-of-life
- Gains in quality of life are preferred to gains in life expectancy at end-of-life
- Some differences are observed across the individual and social perspective
- Impact of beneficiaries' age on preferences is minor